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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
1

Appellant filed his appeal in the Supreme Court of Utah on November 7,

2000 Thereaftei, the Supreme Court under date of Januaiy 17, 2001, directed that the
case be tiansfened to the Court of Appeals foi disposition Appellant appeals fiom the
Ordei of the Honoiable Rodney S Page dated October 5, 2000, which granted Davis
County's Motion to Dismiss
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1

It is Appellee Davis County's position that Appellant raises no issue to be

decided by this Court and, consequently, the ruling of the lower Court dismissing
Plaintiffs Complaint against Appellee Davis County should be affirmed The Brief of
Appellant is so muddled and flawed that Appellee Davis County will not attempt to
mteipret the issues raised by it Rathei, the issue which Appellee Davis County addresses
is that the lower Court was correct in granting Appellee Davis County's Motion to
Dismiss and this Court should affirm the decision of the lower Court
2

Appellant is not entitled to an awaid of attorney's fees against Appellee

Davis County
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable rules and statutes aie as follows
1

Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

2

Section 78-3-13 4, Utah Code Ann, (1953) as amended,

3

Section 78-3-19, Utah Code Ann , (1953) as amended,
1

4.

Section 78-3-14.2, Utah Code Ann., (1953) as amended,

5.

Section 78-3-24, Utah Code Ann., (1953) as amended, and

6.

Section 78-27-56.5, Utah Code Ann., (1953) as amended, disposes of
Appellant's claim for attorney's fees.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS
On July 23, 1997, Appellant filed his Complaint pro se in the District Court of
Davis County naming Appellee Davis County as a party defendant. The prayer for relief
by Appellant against Appellee Davis County is as follows:
Denis County shall on August 22, 1997, impanel in Davis
County a jury of its citizens to determine the facts of
Plaintiffs Davis County real property with the Honorable A.
Lynn Payne presiding.
Appellant alleges in his Complaint that he is the owner of certain property located in
Davis County, but Appellee Davis County is not the owner of the property, nor is
Appellee Davis County in any contractual relationship with Appellant.
Appellee Davis County filed its Motion to Dismiss with the Court on August 5,
1997, asserting that Plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed for the reason that it failed
to state a claim against Davis County upon which relief could be granted. Appellee Davis
County's Motion to Dismiss was granted by the Court on October 5, 2000. Thereafter,
Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on November 3, 2000.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under no facts that could be presented before the District Court would Appellee
2

Davis County, a body politic of the State of Utah, have authority to empanel a jury to
hear a case and require that it be before a District Court Judge from Uintah County.
Therefore, the lower Court properly granted Appellee Davis County's Motion to Dismiss.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED DAVIS COUNTY'S
MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE NO FACTS PRESENTED
BEFORE THE COURT WOULD AUTHORIZE APPELLEE DAVIS
COUNTY TO IMPANEL A JURY TO HEAR A CASE AND
REQUIRE THAT IT BE BEFORE A DISTRICT JUDGE FROM
UINTAH COUNTY.
Plaintiffs Complaint and his numerous motions and memoranda are garbled and
unclear as to what the basis is for his claim against Appellee Davis County. It appears
from his Complaint he asserts ownership in propeity that is located within Davis County
but no claim is made that Appellee Davis County owns any propeity in which he claims
an interest or is any contractual relationship with Appellee Davis County. The prayer in
the Complaint of Appellant is as follows:
Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgment against defendants as
follows... (2) Davis County shall on August 22, 1997 empanel
in Davis County, a Jury of its citizens to determine the facts
ofplaintiffs Davis County Real Property with the Hon. A.
Lynn Payne, presiding.
The prayer in Appellant's Complaint is more in the form of a special writ requiring
Appellee Davis County to impanel a jury, thereby allowing Appellant's claim to be heard.
Appellee Davis County has not operated or been responsible for the operation of

the District Courts for many years. Pursuant to Section 78-3-13.4, Utah Code Ann.,
(1953) as amended, the County's deteimination to tiansfer the responsibility for operation
of the District Court to the State is irrevocable. Moreover, in Section 78-3-14.2, Utah
Code Ann. (1953) as amended, the Legislature mandated that the District Court, not the
County, develop a system of case management. Additionally, in Section 78-3-19, Utah
Code Ann., (1953) as amended, the Legislature created an administrative system for all
courts of the State which is separate and apart from any control that could be exercised by
Appellee Davis County. Under Section 78-3-24, Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended, the
Court Administrator is given responsibility to manage the non-judicial activities of the
Courts.
Under no facts presented by Plaintiff/Appellant would Davis County be authorized
to impanel a jury. The District Court or the Court Administrator's Office would have
jurisdiction and control over the court system and not Appellee Davis County. In Liquor
Control Commissioners v. Athas, 243P.2d 441 (Utah 1952), the Court ruled that a
complaint does not fail to state a claim unless it appears to a certainty that the Plaintiff
would be entitled to no relief under state of facts which could be proved in support of the
claim. Appellee Davis County respectfully asserts that Plaintiff Appellee is entitled to no
relief against Appellee Davis County under any state of facts which could be proved in
support of his claim. Therefore, Appellee Davis County urges the Court to affirm the
ruling of the District Court which granted Appellee Davis County's Motion to Dismiss.

4

ARGUMENT
POINT II
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES
AGAINST APPELLEE DAVIS COUNTY.
Appellant in his prayer for relief demands attorney's fees against Appellee Davis
County. Section 78-27-56.5, Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended, states the following :
A court may awardcosts and attorney's fees to either party
that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory
note, written contract, or other writing executed after April
28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written
contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover
attorneys' fees.
The statutory provision is consistent with prior Utah case law. In Carr v. Enoch
Smith Co., 781.P2d 1292 (Utah Court of Appeals 1989), the court said:
We do, however, find error in awarding attorney's fees in
favor of Smith. "The general rule in Utah is that attorney
fees cannot be recovered absent statutory authorization or
contract. " Cooper v. Deseret Federal Savings and Loan
Association. 757 P. 2d 483, 486 (Utah Court of Appeals
1988). See also Mecham v Benson 590P.2d 304, 309 (Utah
1979)...
At page 1296.
There is no promissory note, written contract or any other written instrument
executed by Davis County that would authorize the payment of attorney's fees.
Therefore, Appellant is entitled to no award of attorney's fees against Appellee Davis
County.

5

CONCLUSION
Appellee Davis County respectfully submits that based upon the foregoing
arguments this Court must dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the lower Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /S~ day of June, 2001.

Gerald ^ r Hess, Chief Ctvil Deputy
Davis County Attorney's Office
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
Davis County
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Exhibit 1

39

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

A.L.R. — Liability of attorney, acting for
client, for malicious prosecution, 46 A L.R 4th
249.
Inherent power of federal district court to
impose monetary sanctions on counsel m absence of contempt of court, 77 A L.R Fed 789
Comment Note — General principles regardmg imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 A.L.R. Fed
107
,
„
1 T* i -« m 1
J
Imposmon of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
,
.n .
r i J
a.
signmg and verification of pleadings, m actions
for defamation, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 181
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in action
for wrongful discharge from employment, 96
A.LR Fed 13

Rule 12

Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions
for securities fraud, 97 A.L R Fed 107
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fede r a i R u i e s 0 f Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions
f o r in fh c tion of emotional distress, 98 A.L.R
jreci 442
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fedpertalmng to
e r a [ R u l e g of C m l p r o c e d u
j
^ ,
i f
±
r
signing and verification of pleadings, m antie
*
99 A L R Fed 573
t n s t ac
i
T°ns/
r
Procedural requirements for imposition of
sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 100 A.L.R. Fed 5o6.

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the
court, a defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service
*of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty
days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state.
A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer
thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply
to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer
or. if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the
order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by
order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a
pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial
on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after
notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite
statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
(7) failure to join an indispensable party A motion making any of these
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim
for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but
vithin such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on

Rule 12

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
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the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably
be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more
definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall
point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is
granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of
the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike
the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems
just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule
may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a
party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses
and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion,
the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or
objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not
presented either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure
to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal
defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or
by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and
except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss
the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as
provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a
waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination
by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the
plaintiff to file a S300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff.
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the
United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990; November 1, 2000.)

Exhibit 2

78-3-13

78-3-13.

JUDICIAL CODE

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 152, § 26 and ch.
248, § 50 each repeals § 78-3-13, as amended
by Laws 1969, ch. 250, § 1, providing that a

district judge may hold court in any county on
request, effective April 25, 1988.

78-3-13.4. Transfer of court operating responsibilities —
Facilities - Staff - Budget.
(1) A county's determination to transfer responsibility for operation of the
district court to the state is irrevocable.
(2) (a) Court space suitable for the conduct of judicial business as specified
by the Judicial Council shall be provided by the state from appropriations
made by the Legislature for these purposes.
(b) The state may, in order to carry out its obligation to provide these
facilities, lease space from a county, or reimburse a county for the number
of square feet used by the district. Any lease and reimbursement shall be
determined in accordance with the standards of the State Building Board
applicable to state agencies generally. A county or municipality terminating a lease with the court shall provide written notice to the Judicial
Council at least one year prior to the effective date of the termination.
(c) District courts shall be located in municipalities that are sites for the
district court or circuit court as of January 1,1994. Removal of the district
court from the municipality shall require prior legislative approval by
joint resolution.
(3) The state shall provide legal reference materials for all district judges'
chambers and courtrooms, as required by Judicial Council rule. Maintenance
of county law libraries shall be in consultation with the court executive of the
district court.
(4) (a) At the request of the Judicial Council, the county or municipality
shall provide staff for the district court in county seats or municipalities
under contract with the administrative office of the courts.
(b) Payment for necessary expenses shall be by a contract entered into
annually between the state and the county or municipality, which shall
specifically state the agreed costs of personnel, supplies, and services, as
well as the method and terms of payment.
(c) Workload measures prepared by the state court administrator and
projected costs for the next fiscal year shall be considered in the negotiation of contracts.
(d) Each May 1 preceding the general session of the Legislature, the
county or municipality shall submit a budget request to the Judicial
Council, the governor, and the legislative fiscal analyst for services to be
rendered as part of the contract under Subsection (b) for the fiscal year
immediately following the legislative session. The Judicial Council shall
consider this information in developing its budget request. The legislative
fiscal analyst shall provide the Legislature with the county's or municipality's original estimate of expenses. By June 15 preceding the state's
fiscal year, the county and the state court administrator shall negotiate a
contract to cover expenses in accordance with the appropriation approved
by the Legislature. The contracts may not include payments for expenses
of service of process, indigent defense costs, or other costs or expenses
provided by law as an obligation of the county or municipality.
22
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History: C. 1953, 78-3-13.4, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 152, § 20; 1991, ch. 268, § 26; 1996,
ch. 198, § 52.

78-3-13.5, 78-3-14.

78-3-14.5

Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, rewrote this seetion.

Repealed.

Repeals. - Section 78-3-13.5 (L. 1963, ch.
191, § 2), relating to election of presiding district judge and assignment ofjudges to assist in
trial of cases in other districts, was repealed by
Laws 1967, ch. 222, § 9. Laws 1988, ch. 152,

§ 26 and ch. 248, § 50 both repeal § 78-3-14,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating to ex parte
applications from another district, effective
April 25, 1988.

78-3-14.2. District court case management.
(1) The district court of each district shall develop systems of case management.
(2) The case management systems developed by a district court shall:
(a) ensure judicial accountability for the just and timely disposition of
cases;
(b) provide for each judge a full judicial work load that accommodates
differences in the subject matter or complexity of cases assigned to
different judges; and
(c) provide that judges of the district court and judges of the court
formerly denominated the circuit court who took office prior to July 1,
1991, are entitled to be assigned only cases from the subject matter
jurisdiction of their respective courts as that jurisdiction existed on June
30, 1996. If the volume of such cases does not constitute a full work load,
other cases shall be assigned.
(3) A district court may establish divisions within the court for the efficient
management of different types of cases. The existence of divisions within the
court may not affect the jurisdiction of the court nor the validity of court orders.
The existence of divisions within the court may not impede public access to the
courts.
History: C. 1953, 78-3-14.2, enacted by L.
1996, ch. 198, § 53.

Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 198, § 70
makes the act effective on July 1, 1996.

78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures.
(1) Except as provided in this section, district court fines and forfeitures
collected for violation of state statutes shall be paid to the state treasurer.
(2) Fines and forfeitures collected by the court for violation of a state statute
or county or municipal ordinance constituting a misdemeanor or an infraction
shall be remitted V2 to the state treasurer and V2 to the treasurer of the
government which prosecutes or which would prosecute the violation.
(3) Fines and forfeitures collected for violations of Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code of Utah, or Title 73, Chapter 18, State Boating Act, shall be paid
to the state treasurer.
(a) For violations of Title 23, the state treasurer shall allocate 85% to
the Division of Wildlife Resources and 15% to the General Fund.
(b) For violations of Title 73, Chapter 18, the state treasurer shall
allocate 85% to the Division of Parks and Recreation and 15% to the
General Fund.
23

DISTRICT COURTS
History: C. 1953, 78-3-13.4, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 152, § 20; 1991, ch. 268, § 26; 1996,
ch. 198, § 52.

78-3-14.5

Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, rewrote this seetion

78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed.
Repeals. - Section 78-3-13.5 (L. 1963, ch.
191, § 2), relating to election of presiding distnct judge and assignment ofjudges to assist in
tnal of cases in other distnets, was repealed by
Laws 1967, ch. 222, § 9. Laws 1988, ch. 152,

§ 26 and ch 248, § 50 both repeal § 78-3-14,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating to ex parte
applications from another distnct, effective
April 25, 1988

78-3-14.2. District court case management.
(1) The district court of each district shall develop systems of case management.
(2) The case management systems developed by a district court shall:
(a) ensure judicial accountability for the just and timely disposition of
cases;
(b) provide for each judge a full judicial work load that accommodates
differences in the subject matter or complexity of cases assigned to
different judges; and
(c) provide that judges of the district court and judges of the court
formerly denominated the circuit court who took office prior to July 1,
1991, are entitled to be assigned only cases from the subject matter
jurisdiction of their respective courts as that jurisdiction existed on June
30, 1996. If the volume of such cases does not constitute a full work load,
other cases shall be assigned.
(3) A district court may establish divisions within the court for the efficient
management of different types of cases. The existence of divisions within the
court may not affect the jurisdiction of the court nor the validity of court orders.
The existence of divisions within the court may not impede public access to the
courts.
History: C. 1953, 78-3-14.2, enacted by L.
1996, ch. 198, § 53.

Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch 198, § 70
makes the act effective on July 1, 1996.

78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures.
(1) Except as provided in this section, district court fines and forfeitures
collected for violation of state statutes shall be paid to the state treasurer.
(2) Fines and forfeitures collected by the court for violation of a state statute
or county or municipal ordinance constituting a misdemeanor or an infraction
shall be remitted ¥z to the state treasurer and Vi to the treasurer of the
government which prosecutes or which would prosecute the violation.
(3) Fines and forfeitures collected for violations of Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code of Utah, or Title 73, Chapter 18, State Boating Act, shall be paid
to the state treasurer.
(a) For violations of Title 23, the state treasurer shall allocate 85% to
the Division of Wildlife Resources and 15% to the General Fund.
(b) For violations of Title 73, Chapter 18, the state treasurer shall
allocate 85% to the Division of Parks and Recreation and 15% to the
General Fund.
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78-3-21

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — The
Training of Court Managers, 1981 B.Y.U. L.
Rev. 683.

78-3-19. Purpose of act.
The purpose of this act is to create an administrative system for all courts of
this state, subject to central direction by the Judicial Council, to enable these
courts to provide uniformity and coordination in the administration of justice.
History: C. 1953, 78-3-19, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 202, § 2; 1977, ch. 77, § 57; 1983,
ch. 156, § 1; 1986, ch. 47, § 51.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws
1973, ch. 202, § 2 repeals former § 78-3-19 (L.
1967, ch. 222, § 3; 1971, ch. 209, § 1), relating

78-3-20.

to the appointment of assistants by the administrator, and enacts the above section.
Meaning of "this act." - The term "this
act" refers to Laws 1973, ch. 202, which enacted
§§ 78-3-18 to 78-3-27

Definitions.

As used in this act:
(1) "Administrator" means the administrator of the courts appointed
under Section 78-3-23.
(2) "Conference" means the annual statewide judicial conference established by Section 78-3-27.
(3) "Council" means the Judicial Council established by Article VIII,
Sec. 12, Utah Constitution.
(4) "Courts" mean all courts of this state, including all courts of record
and not of record.
History: C. 1953, 78-3-20, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 202, § 3; 1977, ch. 77, § 58; 1983,
ch. 156, § 2; 1986, ch. 47, § 52; 1988, ch. 248,
§ 13.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws
1973, ch. 202, § 3 repeals former § 78-3-20 (L.
1967, ch. 222, § 4; 1969, ch. 251, § 1; 1971, ch.

209, § 2), relating to designation, compensation and powers of an assignment justice, and
enacts the above section.
Meaning of "this act." - The term "this
act" refers to Laws 1973, ch. 202, which enacted
§§ 78-3-18 to 78-3-27

78-3-21, Judicial Council — Creation — Members —
Terms and election — Responsibilities — Reports [Effective until January 1, 1997].
(1) The Judicial Council, established by Article VIII, Section 12, Utah
Constitution, shall be composed of:
(a) the chief justice of the Supreme Court;
(b) one member elected by the justices of the Supreme Court;
(c) one member elected by the judges of the Court of Appeals;
(d) five members elected by the judges of the district courts;
(e) two members elected by the judges of the juvenile courts;
(f) three members elected by the justice court judges; and
< g) a member or ex officio member of the Board of Commissioners of the
Utah State Bar who is an active member of the Bar in good standing
elected by the Board of Commissioners.
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78-3-23. Administrator of the courts — Appointment —
Qualifications — Salary.
The Supreme Court shall appoint a chief administrative officer of the council
who shall have the title of the administrator of the courts and shall serve at the
pleasure of the council and/or the Supreme Court. The administrator shall be
selected on the basis of professional ability and experience in the field of public
administration and shall possess an understanding of court procedures as well
as of the nature and significance of other court services. He shall devote his full
time and attention to the duties of his office, and shall receive a salary equal
to that of a district judge.
History: C. 1953, 78-3-23, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 202, § 6.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1973, ch. 202, § 6 repeals former § 78-3-23 (L.
1967, ch 222, § 7), the title of the Court Administrator Act, and enacts the above section

Sunset Act. - See § 63-55-278 for the repeal date of the Office of the Court Admimstrator, created by this section.
Cross-References. — State court admmistrator, Rule 3-301, Code of Judicial Admimstration.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Court Commissioners <§=»
1 to 3.

78-3-24. Court administrator — Powers, duties, and responsibilities.
Under the general supervision of the presiding officer of the Judicial Council,
and within the policies established by the council, the administrator shall:
(1) organize and administer all of the nonjudicial activities of the
courts;
(2) assign, supervise, and direct the work of the nonjudicial officers of
the courts;
(3) implement the standards, policies, and rules established by the
council;
(4) formulate and administer a system of personnel administration,
including in-service training programs;
(5) prepare and administer the state judicial budget, fiscal, accounting,
and procurement activities for the operation of the courts of record, and
assist justices'courts in their budgetary, fiscal, and accounting procedures;
(6) conduct studies of the business of the courts, including the preparation of recommendations and reports relating to them;
(7) develop uniform procedures for the management of court business,
including the management of court calendars;
(8) maintain liaison with the governmental and other public and
private groups having an interest in the administration of the courts;
(9) establish uniform policy concerning vacations and sick leave for
judges and nonjudicial officers of the courts;
(10) establish uniform hours for court sessions throughout the state and
may, with the consent of the presiding officer of the Judicial Council, call
and appoint justices or judges of courts of record to serve temporarily as
Court of Appeals, district court, or juvenile court judges and set reasonable
compensation for their services;
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(11) when necessary for administrative reasons, change the county for
trial of any case if no party to the litigation files timely objections to this
change;
(12) organize and administer a program of continuing education for
judges and support staff, including training for justices of the peace;
(13) provide for an annual meeting for each level of the courts of record,
and the annual judicial conference; and
(14) perform other duties as assigned by the presiding officer of the
council.
History: C. 1953, 78-3-24, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 202, § 7; 1977, ch. 77, § 60; 1981,
ch. 90, § 6; 1983, ch. 156, § 5; 1986, ch. 47,
§ 55; 1988, ch. 248, § 15; 1996, ch. 198, § 56.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, deleted "or circuit

court" before "judges" near the end of Subsection (10).
Cross-References. - Court administrators, Rule 3-301, Code of Judicial Administration.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in City of Orem v. Crandall, 760 R2d
920 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Court Commissioners §=>
1, 3 to 5.

78-3-25. Assistants for administrator of the courts — Appointment of trial court executives.
(1) The administrator of the courts, with the approval of the presiding officer
of the council, is responsible for the establishment of positions and salaries of
assistants as necessary to enable him to perform the powers and duties vested
in him by this act, including the positions of appellate court administrator,
district court administrator, juvenile court administrator, and justices' court
administrator, whose appointments shall be made by the administrator of the
courts with the concurrence of the respective boards as established by the
council.
(2) The district court administrator, with the concurrence of the presiding
judge of a district or the district court judge in single judge districts, may
appoint in each district a trial court executive. The trial court executive may
appoint, subject to budget limitations, necessary support personnel including
clerks, research clerks, secretaries, and other persons required to carry out the
work of the court. The trial court executive shall supervise the work of all
nonjudicial court staff and serve as administrative officer of the district.
History: C. 1953, 78-3-25, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 202, § 8; 1983, ch. 156, § 6; 1986,
ch. 47, § 56; 1996, ch. 198, § 57.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, deleted "circuit

court administrator" from the list of administrators in Subsection (1).
Meaning of "this act." - The term uthis
act," in Subsection (1), refers to Laws 1973, ch.
202, which enacted §§ 78-3-18 to 78-3-27.
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(Utah 1987); Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d
306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); DeBry v. Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank, 754 P.2d 60 (Utah
1988); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 R2d 163

(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Cascade Energy & Metals
Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1990);
Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in costs or attorneys' fees, 68 A.L.R.3d 209.
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553.
Attorneys' fees as recoverable in fraud action,
Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless Ac- 44 A.L.R.4th 776.
tions, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 593.
Attorneys' fees: obduracy as basis for stateRecent Developments in Utah Law — Legis- court award, 49 A.L.R.4th 825.
lative Enactments — Attorney's Fees, 1989
Attorney's liability under state law for opposUtah L. Rev. 342.
ing party's counsel fees, 56 A.L.R.4th 486.
Note, "The Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Recovery of attorneys' fees and costs of litigaDistress: A New Cause of Action in Utah," 1989 tion incurred as result of breach of agreement
Utah L. Rev. 571.
not to sue, 9 AL.R.5th 933.
A.L.R. — Construction and application of
Award of counsel fees to prevailing party
state statute or rule subjecting party making based on adversary's bad faith, obduracy, or
untrue allegations or denials to payment of other misconduct, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 833.

78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights to recover
attorney's fees.
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in
a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory
note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover
attorney's fees.
History: C. 1953,78-27-56.5, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 79, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Discretion of court.
Cited.
Discretion of court.
In an action involving claims for breach of
warranty, misrepresentation, and mutual mistake, where the only claim stemmed from the

contract, it was not an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to determine not to attempt to
allocate the attorney's fees and denial of attorney fees was appropriate. Schafir v. Harrigan,
879 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Cited in Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d
1292 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Saunders v. Sharp,
840 R2d 796 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Attorney's liability under state law
for opposing party's counsel fees, 56 A.L.R.4th
486.

Excessiveness or adequacy of attorneys' fees
in matters involving real estate, 10 A.L.R.5th
448.
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Lynn Allan Jenkins I.
Three East 2750 South
Bountiful Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 299-1520
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LYNN ALLAN JENKINS,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT WITH
JURY DEMAND

vs.
ALBERT "LYNN" PAYNE, DAVID
YOUNG PAYNE, UTAH STATE BAR,
NORTH SALT LAKE CITY, DAVIS
COUNTY, and UINTAH COUNTY,
Defendants.

civil NO. c\ioiirr>)
Judge

RODNEYS. PAGE
D-'STRICT JUDGF

COMES NOW PLAINTIFF Lynn Allan Jenkins and alleges as follows:
1. Plaintiff is a bona fide and actual resident of Davis
County, Utah, and has been for more than five years immediately
prior to the commencement of this action and owns or controls
property in Davis County.
2. Plaintiff and Linda Marie Mitchell Jenkins are husband
and wife, having been married at Magna City Utah, on the 22 nd day
of August, 1962.
3. Plaintiff and his wife have six children as issue of
said marriage, to-wit:
JULIE ANN, born July 16, 1963
LYNN ALLAN, born July 2, 19 64
ANDREW CHRISTEN, born February 15, 1969
JODIE MARIE, born July 6, 1970
MICHELLE DEONE, born April 6, 1974
MICHAEL DAVID, born November 6, 197 6

Said children are now in their own care and custody.
4. Defendant Albert "Lynn" Payne, resides in Uintah
County, Utah, and is believed to be the son of "Albert" L. Payne
and Sylvia Young Payne. Defendant Lynn Payne is also a Utah
District Court Judge for Uintah County and a member in good
standing with the Utah State Bar.
5. Defendant David Young Payne resides in Davis County
Utah, and is believed to be the son of "Albert" L. Payne and Sylvia
Young Payne. Defendant David Young Payne, is a Judge for North Salt
Lake City, Utah and a member in good standing with the Utah State
Bar.
6. Defendant Utah State Bar is the regulatory branch for
the practice of law in the State of Utah.
7. On January 11, 1995, on a public highway called
Interstate 15, in North Salt Lake City, Utah, plaintiff was stopped
by the Utah Highway Patrol for crossing over the left yellow line
of said highway for a distance of approximately 50 feet at 60 MPH.
8. Plaintiff after taking and passing a blood alcohol
breath test, was arrested for driving under the influence of
alcohol even though he had a negative blood alcohol level as shown
on North Salt Lake City's breath machine.
9. As a result plaintiff was thrown into jail and blood
was taken from his body and given to the U.S. Mail Service's
custody who then delivered the blood samples to the Utah Department
of Health about one week later. The blood samples analyzed by the
Department of Health showed a negative alcohol level however 72
2

nano grams of alprazalam which North Salt Lake City determined to
be beyond any therapeutic level allowed under Utah law,
10. On or about January 12, 1995, plaintiff filed a
demand for Jury Trial with the North Salt Lake City Court, which
was denied by its judge the Hon. David Young Payne and City
Prosecutor Michael Nielsen.
11. On or about March 15, 1995, plaintiff filed with the
Hon. A. Lynn Payne a demand for Jury Trial in a Uintah County cause
of action that should more properly in the jurisdiction of Davis
County.
12. On or about April 26, 19 95, Judge A. Lynn Payne ruled
that plaintiff was not entitled to a Jury Trial on his Davis County
real property and its Uniform Real Estate Contract purportedly date
December 26, 1977, which clearly was paid in full on December 27,
1977 as recorded by the Davis County Recorder in August 1978.
13. July 16, 1997, Judge Lynn Payne ruled that the Utah
State Bar picnic to be held on August 22, 1997 at a park near his
home, was more important than the plaintiff's wife and his Thirtyfifth Wedding Anniversary and scheduled his continuing non-jury
trial on the plaintiff's Davis County real property.
Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgment against defendants as
follows (1) the Utah State Bar shall cancel its August 22, 1997,
Basin Bar Picnic so that plaintiff may attend his wife Anniversary
Party; (2) Davis County shall on August 22, 1997 empanel in Davis
County,

a Jury

of

its

citizens

to determine

the

facts of

plaintiff's Davis County Real Property with the Hon. A. Lynn Payne,
3

presiding; (3) that North Salt Lake City shall grant plaintiff a
Jury Trial in its courtroom on the issues of its January 11, 1995
DUI arrest; (4) Uintah County shall file a report with the court as
to its findings an conclusions of law concerning the Uintah County
Court lawsuit; (5) for plaintiff's costs and attorney fees; AND for
such other relief the^court deem proper.
DATED this yQ

day of July 1997.

Plaintiff
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT
LYNN ALLAN JENKINS,
Plaintiffs),
vs
ALBERT "LYNN" PAYNE, DAVID
YOUNG PAYNE, UTAH STATE BAR,
NORTH SALT LAKE CITY, DAVIS
COUNTY and UINTAH COUNTY
Defendant(s)

RULING ON DEFENDANT NORTH
SALT LAKE CITY AND DAVIS
COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(ENTITLED MOTION FOR
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT)

Case No 970700315

Comes now the Court and having reviewed Defendant North Salt Lake City and Davis
County's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Entitled Motion for
Declaratory Judgment) and having reviewed the Memorandums in support thereof and in
opposition thereto and having heard the arguments of Plaintiff and counsel and being fully
advised in the premises, the Court hereby rules as follows
The Motions of North Salt Lake City and Davis County to dismiss are hereby granted
based upon the arguments set forth in their respecm e Memorandums filed in support thereof
As to Plaintiffs Motion Entitled Motion for Declaratory Judgment which the Court treats
as a motion for summary judgment, the Court rules as follows

This Court has this date and heretofore either granted the motion of each defendant to
dismiss or dismissed them by stipulation and therefore, denies the Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment. Further, since there are no defendants left, the Court hereby dismisses
Plaintiffs Complaint for no cause of action.
Dated this <g~^ day of October, 2000.
By the Court:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, Ruling, postage prepaid, to the following
Mr Lynn A Jenkins
Three East 2750 South
Bountiful, UT 84010
Mr Gerald E Hess
Deputy Davis County Attorney
800 West State Street
P O Box 618
Farmington, UT 84025
Mr Kent L Christiansen
448 East 400 South, Suite 301
Salt Lake City UT 841111
Dated this *f

day of October, 2000.

Clerk/ Deputy Clerk

